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THE THREE LEVELS OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION1
abstract
Against the tendency to compare EU citizenship with national state citizenship, the article argues that 
European Union citizenship represents a hybrid type, as it is derivative of Member State nationality. 
After pointing out the tensions caused by this derivative character with respect to mobility rights, the 
article considers the limits of some strategies of dealing with such difficulties. Finally the article argues 
that realistic solutions should start from accepting a potentially coherent and normatively attractive 
constellation of three interconnected membership regimes: A birthright-based one at the Member State 
level, a residential one at the local level, and a derivative regime with residence-based rights at the 
supranational level, which would lead to a few modest reforms.
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1 An earlier version of this essay was published in the German Law Journal, vol. 15, August 2014. 
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THE THREE LEVELS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
European Union citizenship is derived from Member State nationality. This fact often has 
been considered a “birth defect” to be overcome by either disconnecting EU citizenship 
from Member State citizenship or by reversing the relationship in a federal model so that 
Member State citizenship would be derived from that of the Union. I argue in this essay, first, 
that derivative citizenship in a union of States can be defended as a potentially stable and 
democratically attractive feature of the architecture of the EU polity. And I argue, second, that 
EU citizenship should not be assessed as a freestanding conception but as one layer in a multi-
level model of democratic membership in a union of States. This perspective is not a defense 
of the status quo, but rather allows for – or even requires – a series of reforms addressing a 
number of inconsistencies and democratic deficiencies in the current citizenship regime.
Most academics writings about Union citizenship tend to compare it to that which they know 
best: nation State citizenship. It then comes as no surprise when they conclude that the 
current construction of EU citizenship is internally incoherent, externally not sufficiently 
inclusive, and also lacking in democratic legitimacy. To a certain degree, I agree with this 
criticism; however, such authors often apply the wrong standard of comparison and therefore 
are likely to promote faulty solutions. As the EU Treaties clearly have spelled out since 
the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, EU citizenship is complementary or additional to Member 
State nationality without replacing it. National citizenship is a constitutive element of EU 
citizenship and therefore cannot serve as an external standard of comparison. 
Scholars have described the EU polity as a multi-layered system of governance and 
governments for some time now. The EU consists not only of the supranational institutions 
of the European Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), but also of the national parliaments and governments of the 
Member States. There is a corresponding system of multi-level citizenship in the Union 
that needs to be studied and evaluated as a constellation where individuals have plural 
memberships and where citizenship regimes are connected with each other across levels.
This multi-level perspective avoids regarding EU citizenship as either a post-national 
alternative to Member State citizenship or as a mere appendix filled with a few additional 
rights that does not deserve the label “citizenship” in the strong sense of a status of equal 
membership in a self-governing polity. 
We neither have to envision a futuristic world nor travel far back in history in order to 







already internally contains some type of multi-level citizenship regime. It is true that only a 
few federal States, such as Austria, Switzerland, and the United States of America, formally 
acknowledge in their constitutions a citizenship of their provinces or States. Yet even highly 
centralized States, such as France, have elections for regional assemblies that enjoy a range 
of devolved decision-making powers. While unitary and federal constitutions differ greatly 
with regard to the political status and powers of sub-national territories, all democratic 
States, apart from micro States and city States, are subdivided into municipalities with 
democratically-elected offices, such as local councilors or mayors.
The qualifier “self-governing” polity used in the above definition of citizenship does not 
refer to sovereignty or independence in external relations to other polities. Instead, it refers 
to the concept of “popular sovereignty” as the requirement that political authority must 
be internally authorized by citizens through democratic participation and procedures. This 
interpretation allows dependent polities to be considered as self-governing even if their 
powers have been delegated or circumscribed by another level of government. Municipalities 
may be constitutionally-dependent polities whose powers are determined by higher-level 
governments such as those of provinces or sovereign States. Yet, as municipalities have 
devolved autonomy and democratic elections for local governments, they also have their own 
citizens. 
From a neo-republican perspective emphasizing non-domination (Pettit 1997, Skinner 1998), 
local level citizenship is not only a common feature of contemporary democracies but also 
a democratic requirement. It makes little difference in a classic liberal view whether all 
individual rights are guaranteed by a central government in a uniform way throughout a 
State territory or whether local governments are responsible for protecting some of these 
rights. A neo-republican emphasis on non-domination provides, however, a positive reason 
for local citizenship. If self-government is considered as an intrinsically important value 
preventing the domination of citizens by the arbitrary exercise of power, then it is not a trivial 
or morally neutral question whether local matters are decided by governments accountable to 
local citizens or by national governments accountable to all national citizens. If central State 
authorities were in charge of deciding all matters of local government, then representatives of 
national majorities would unjustly dominate the inhabitants of municipalities. 
Conceiving of democratic States as polities with nested layers of local, regional, and State 
level citizenship is not only a useful analogy for better understanding the EU citizenship 
constellation, but sub-national citizenships also form an integral part of this constellation. 
There are not only two, but at least three distinct levels of individual membership in the Union 
that are universally present throughout the EU polity and include all its resident citizens: 
local, national, and supranational citizenships.1 
If citizenship at its core is a membership status, then the first task when describing this 
triple level structure is analyzing the rules determining who is a member at each level of the 
polity. For the national level, such rules are laid down in nationality laws. These laws differ 
enormously with regard to their specific legal provisions and conditions for acquisition 
1  In many, but not all, Member States there is a fourth level of sub-state regional citizenship between the local 
and the national one. Where it exists, citizenship at this level shares structural similarities with the supranational 
citizenship of the EU: it is generally derived from Member State nationality and it is activated through residence. 
There are exceptions, such as the franchise for non-national EU citizens in elections to the Scottish Parliament and 
Welsh assembly. Since regional citizenship is not a general feature of the multilevel structure of EU citizenship, I will 
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and loss of nationality, not only globally, but also within the EU. Though, once such rules 
are compared to the rules for determining citizenship in supranational and local polities, it 
becomes obvious that all nationality laws have a common basic structure and purpose. 
A fundamental feature of nationality law in modern States is automatic acquisition of 
citizenship status at birth, either by descent from citizen parents (ius sanguinis) or by birth 
in the State territory (ius soli). These two principles are often contrasted and associated with 
ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship respectively. This contrast is exaggerated for three 
reasons. First, nearly all States combine both principles. The difference is mainly in how much 
weight each is given. States where ius soli dominates domestically, such as nearly all American 
States, have ius sanguinis provisions for the second generation born abroad. And most States 
where ius sanguinis dominates also have domestically ius soli provisions for foundlings or 
children otherwise born stateless. Second, as demonstrated by Vink and Bauböck (2013), 
an empirical analysis of citizenship law provisions shows that territorial and ethnocultural 
inclusiveness are two orthogonal dimensions rather than two opposite poles on a single 
dimension. There are citizenship regimes that are both territorially and ethnoculturally 
expansive and others that are insular on both dimensions, the differences between ius soli 
and ius sanguinis in many ways are less interesting than their commonalities. Both confer 
citizenship at birth or based on circumstances of birth and turn individuals into citizens 
for an unlimited time that normally is expected to last a whole life. Birthright and lifetime 
citizenship are remarkable features in the context of liberal democracy because they do not 
conform to expectations that membership in a liberal polity should be based on individual 
consent or on inclusion of all who reside in a territorial jurisdiction.
Ius sanguinis is often considered as “inherited” citizenship. The metaphor of inheritance, 
however, is misleading. Ius sanguinis citizenship is not analogous to a property inherited at 
a parent’s death. There is no transaction as with a property previously owned by a parent 
and subsequently owned by the child. In addition, the acquisition of citizenship by the child 
is related to the child’s birth rather than the parent’s death. A somewhat closer, but still 
misleading analogy is the idea of inheriting genetic properties. Children “inherit” most of their 
parents’ genes at conception and share these subsequently with their parents. The same could 
be said about an inherited citizenship status. However, the crucial impact of genetic descent 
is that it underpins a special relation that children have with their parents, distinguishing 
them from the children of other parents. By contrast, iure sanguinis citizenship establishes a 
relation of similarity and equality between all children born to citizen parents rather than a 
special relation between parents and their biological offspring. Citizenship status acquired iure 
sanguinis is a relation of horizontal equality among biologically unrelated individuals whose 
parents were citizens of the same polity. In this respect, ius sanguinis serves exactly the same 
function as ius soli, which also establishes a relation of horizontal equality among those sharing 
the circumstance of birth in a particular territory.
Most of the comparative literature on citizenship focuses on the naturalization of immigrants. 
Yet this is a rather marginal phenomenon compared to the primary function of citizenship 
laws that ensures birthright acquisition for the vast majority. The acquisition of citizenship 
by naturalization and the loss of citizenship through renunciation or withdrawal are merely 
corrective rules serving to resolve discrepancies between a citizenship population determined 
by birthright and a reference population that States want to exclude or include. The need 
for such corrective devices arises mainly because of migrations generating non-resident 
populations with, and resident populations without, birthright citizenship of the reference 
State.
Correcting birthright allocation, though, is also necessary when international borders 
change, either through State breakup and secession or through unification and territorial 
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incorporation. Three different rules have been used for the initial determination of citizenship 
of populations in newly independent States or incorporated territories: (1) A zero option 
including all residents at the time of independence; (2) A restoration option referring back 
to citizenship in an independent predecessor State; and (3) The transformation of a previous 
federal entity citizenship into that of an independent successor State. 
The zero option has been chosen by the vast majority of post-Soviet States which have no 
prior history of independent statehood. Estonia and Latvia opted for a restoration model 
excluding most of their large Russian minorities from access to citizenship at independence 
(Brubaker 1992). In both the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and the peaceful separation of 
Czechoslovakia, the previously fairly insignificant citizenships of the various federal republics 
were upgraded into new national citizenships of the successor States. Just as with ius soli and 
ius sanguinis, these three rules for determining collective acquisitions of citizenship in new 
States or territories can be combined in various ways and are mostly implemented together 
with option rights for a citizenship other than the one assigned through the primary rule.
It is crucial to understand that only shifting international borders automatically lead to 
inclusion or exclusion of entire territorial populations. Democratic States with stable borders 
never include first-generation immigrants without asking for their consent. One might object 
that there is the exceptional case of co-ethnic immigrants in Germany and Israel who have 
been automatically naturalized upon entry. However, these groups have been identified as 
members of the nation prior to immigration. Accepting the invitation to “return” implies 
consent by the immigrant to acquiring full citizenship status.
Correcting birthright allocation through naturalization therefore requires an individual 
application, as does voluntary renunciation by non-resident citizens. Involuntary withdrawal 
of citizenship by the State is sometimes used as a sanction, but may also affect persons 
who are seen as lacking a genuine link to the State concerned. This is sometimes the case 
if persons have inherited their citizenship through birth abroad and have never taken up 
residence in their ancestors’ country of origin. In any case, acquisition and loss of citizenship 
in democratic States that is not based on birthright is regulated by procedures involving 
individual consent or qualifications for membership. Thus, primary determinations of 
citizenship at the birth of both States and individuals are corrected by consent-based 
secondary determinations for individuals who want to change or no longer have a claim to 
retain their initial citizenship.
What is the purpose of birthright citizenship and how can it be justified? All modern States 
are constructed as trans-generational political communities and birthright membership is the 
crucial mechanism supporting their continuity. There are also distinctly democratic reasons 
for birthright allocation. Governments of independent States wield comprehensive political 
powers over their subjects and take decisions affecting future generations in important ways. 
While this may also be true for some powerful non-State actors, such as large corporations, 
only political governments can be held accountable by and be made responsive to citizens. If 
all citizens regarded themselves as merely temporary residents living among other temporary 
residents, then they would have little reason to support long-term decisions for the sake 
of future generations (Bauböck 2011, p. 685). Instead of hoping to win a political argument 
or election, exit would become the preferred response by minorities who regard majority 
decisions as contrary to their fundamental interests or convictions.
The focus of normative critique should therefore not be on birthright as such, but rather 
on those rules generating unjustifiable exclusion or over-inclusion. Every birthright regime 
not properly corrected by fair access to naturalization unjustly excludes first generation 
immigrants. For similar reasons, a ius sanguinis-based regime that automatically includes the 
children of citizens independently of whether their parents have ever lived in the country is 
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over-inclusive as it turns extra-territorial populations into citizens based on a criterion that 
does not indicate a genuine link to the polity.
Yet in contemporary States, citizenship at the local level is no longer determined through 
birthright.2 Liberal democracies grant internal freedom of movement not merely to their 
own citizens, but also to all legal residents in their territory, and local governments provide 
public services to all those residing within their jurisdiction. It is true that most democratic 
States still reserve the franchise in local elections to their national citizens. However, national 
citizens do not have to apply for local naturalization after moving to a different municipality; 
they are automatically included as local citizens with full participatory rights after a certain 
period of residence. Moreover, fourteen European States, twelve of which are EU Member 
States, have fully disconnected local from national citizenship by also enfranchising third-
country nationals (Shaw 2007, pp. 77-80).
We find therefore at the local level a second type of citizenship regime based on ius domicilii, 
i.e. automatic residential membership. Birthright citizenship at the State level has a sticky 
quality due to its strong external dimension. It is not lost through emigration and can be 
passed on to at least the second generation born abroad. This is also a main reason why plural 
nationality is becoming more frequent. A growing number of children of migrant origin 
acquire several citizenships at birth. Moreover, an increasing number of States also tolerate 
dual nationality in cases of naturalization or voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality. 
By contrast, local citizenship is fluid and generally singular at any point in time. Taking up 
residence in another municipality leads to automatic acquisition of a new citizenship and 
automatic loss of a previous one.
This arrangement can again be supported by democratic reasons. Local governments are 
responsible for providing public services to local residents and ought to be accountable to 
these residents. Discrimination on grounds of nationality is arbitrary from the perspective of 
local self-government. But why do arguments in favour of birthright citizenship not also apply 
to the local level? The answer is simply that local residential citizenship is not an independent 
structure. It is nested within a national citizenship regime, so that every local citizen is also 
a member of a trans-generational political community – either as an internal citizen of the 
encompassing State or as an external citizen of a foreign country.
By considering local and national citizenships as a combined multi-level structure, we can 
see how the two principles of residence and birthright supplement each other. The long-term 
perspective of democratic community supported by birthright at the national level provides 
a stable background for more fluid memberships at the local level. Local citizenships are not 
for life, and acquired as easily as they are lost. Mobile individuals will therefore be multiple 
local citizens sequentially over the course of their lives, but not simultaneously, since local 
citizenship has only a very weak external dimension.
There is an additional democratic reason for keeping local citizenships singular at any point in 
time: No citizen should have multiple votes across several sub-state polities because provinces 
and municipalities are integrated into a common structure of government and democratic 
representation.
2  This is a relatively recent development. Birthright citizenship in municipalities (Heimatrecht) in late 19th century 
Austria and Germany was used to restrict internal migration by denying poverty relief and access to local public 
services to citizens residing outside their municipality of birth. Switzerland’s Bürgergemeinden, in which membership 
is acquired at birth, are historical remnants of this system. Today’s hukou system in the Peoples’ Republic of China 
is an extreme case of local birthright citizenship as an instrument of exclusion from social welfare. It is based on ius 
sanguinis so that rural hukou status is even inherited by the second generation of migrant-descent born in cities. 
3. 
Residential 




Intergenerational and residential citizenships are the two basic regimes found in 
contemporary democratic polities. EU citizenship represents a third and hybrid type. When 
asking who are the citizens of the EU, the answer is the nationals of the EU Member States. 
Individual membership in the EU polity is determined neither by an EU birthright, nor by 
residence in the EU, but is derivative of Member State nationality. Yet the control that the 
Member States retain over the acquisition and loss of EU citizenship is exposed to a powerful 
force operating at a transnational level: The right to free movement inside the territory of 
the Union. This residential aspect of EU citizenship is not only articulated in the narrowly 
conceived rights of territorial admission, settlement, and access to employment, but also 
includes a general right of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and applies to 
political rights. EU citizens residing in Member States other than their State of nationality can 
participate there in local and European Parliament elections.
The derivative nature of EU citizenship is not a historically unique construct. The same citizenship 
architecture was characteristic for early stages of federal statehood in Germany, Austria, and 
the United States of America. Switzerland seems to be the only surviving case where federal 
citizenship is formally derived from cantonal citizenship (see Schönberger 2005, pp. 122-124). In 
Switzerland, as in the EU, the distinct polities of the union enjoy wide powers of self-determination 
with regard to naturalization. The important difference is that federal law regulates birthright 
acquisition and loss of citizenship rather than at the level of provincial citizenship.3 Member 
State self-determination in matters of citizenship is therefore stronger in the EU than in any of 
the historical or contemporary federal nations. Even the much looser union between the Nordic 
States, after abandoning post-1945 plans for a common Nordic citizenship, engaged its Member 
States in a harmonization of their citizenship laws so that they would become compatible with 
free movement rights developed through the Nordic Passport Union (Ersbøll 2001, pp. 230-254). No 
such coordination has been possible in the EU, although Member States can subvert each other’s 
immigration controls by producing EU citizens with free access to the rest of the Union.
The tension between the strictly derivative nature of EU citizenship and its residence-based 
free movement rights also generates differential treatments of EU citizens residing in their 
country of nationality and those residing in another Member State, termed here “first country 
nationals” (FCNs) and “second country nationals” (SCNs) respectively. The protection of EU 
citizenship applies in specific ways to those persons who have invoked their free movement 
rights and those who are involved in cross-border situations in other ways. Such individuals 
enjoy, for example, extended rights to family migration that most Member States deny their 
own FCNs who want to invite “third country nationals” (TCNs), such as family members, 
to join them. Such instances of reverse discrimination have been a notorious side effect of 
a construction of EU citizenship that applies more directly to mobile populations than to 
sedentary ones. In a series of recent judgments, most prominent among which are the 2010 
Rottmann4 and 2011 Zambrano5 cases, the CJEU has expanded the meaning of cross-border 
situations to include many that previously were considered to be purely internal.6 In order 
to do so, the Court often must apply a twisted logic that derives fundamental rights from a 
merely potential link with the exercise of free movement.
3  In the United States of America, birthright citizenship was established as a federal power through the 14 
amendment of 1868. Withdrawal of citizenship remained largely under the control of state courts and comprehensive 
protection against denaturalization was only provided by a 1967 landmark decision of the Supreme Court (Afroim v. 
Rusk 387 U.S. 253). Weil 2013.
4  Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449.
5  Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi, 2011 E.C.R. I-1177.
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While free movement generates substantial privileges for SCNs, their most important 
democratic citizenship rights remain less secure than for FCNs. Although EU citizens residing 
in other Member States enjoy voting rights in local and EP elections there, SCNs remain 
excluded from political representation in the national government of their host country, with 
the exception of Cypriot, Irish and Maltese citizens in the UK and British citizens in Ireland 
who can vote in national elections. From a residential citizenship perspective, this is an oddity. 
One can hardly argue that the local franchise is necessary in order to prevent SCNs from 
suffering political disadvantage, while at the same time maintaining that being deprived of the 
much more important national franchise is an acceptable restriction of their free movement 
rights.7
Finally, EU citizenship generates another highly problematic distinction between mobile 
European SCNs and TCN migrants. The residential dimension of EU citizenship has imposed 
a special privilege of local voting rights for SCNs on often-reluctant Member States, such 
as Austria, France, and Germany, all of which adhere to the constitutional idea of a unitary 
people consisting of identical members across all levels of the polity. This has led to a 
distinction between two classes of local citizens (FCNs and SCNs vs. TCNs) that is arbitrary 
from the perspective of local self-government. More generally, there are now two strongly 
contrasting approaches to the integration of migrants in the EU. Member States and the EU 
itself promote active integration policies for TCNs that combine sanctions and tests with 
affirmative measures, while for intra-EU migrants, a market citizenship logic dictates a laissez-
faire approach assuming that unconstrained mobility and non-discrimination is all that is 
needed for social integration.
Some of these problems could be addressed by weakening the derivative nature of EU 
citizenship and moving forward on the road towards a fully residential citizenship not only at 
the local, but also at the supranational level. Allow me to sketch briefly four possible steps on 
this road.
A first reform would introduce the automatic acquisition of EU citizenship, but not Member 
State nationality, by long-term resident TCNs. This proposal, which has been occasionally 
endorsed by migrant lobby organizations, MEPs and the Committee of the Regions as well as 
by some scholars, would create two classes of EU citizens: those for whom this status is derived 
from their nationality and those for whom it is instead derived from residence. While the 
reform would lead to more inclusion by providing long-term resident TCNs with local voting 
rights throughout the EU and all the other privileges of EU citizens, it can hardly be seen as 
overcoming current concerns in Member States about immigrant integration. Resolving these 
issues by removing them from the domestic agenda of Member States can only breed further 
anti-EU resentment among Member State electorates. Finally, this proposal would also remove 
the most powerful argument for opening access to national citizenship to all long-term 
resident immigrants. If these immigrants enjoy automatic access to EU citizenship, they will 
not only lack incentives for naturalization, but will also be perceived as having no substantive 
claim to full membership and political participation at the national levels.
A second and more radical proposal would address this latter problem for SCNs by abolishing 
any remaining distinctions between FCNs and SCNs and granting the latter a residence-
based franchise in national elections. If this reform were adopted after the first one, it would 
also benefit TCNs. This move would retain the exclusionary potential of nationality laws in 
regulating access to EU citizenship, but would effectively eliminate any traces of the derivative 








nature of EU citizenship with regard to its content of rights, leaving Member State nationality 
behind as a hard but empty shell.
A third possible reform could then respond to this outcome by abolishing birthright 
citizenship in Member States and establishing it instead as the basic principle for determining 
EU citizenship. All those born in the territory of the EU – with possible conditions for prior 
parental residence as in all current European versions of national-level ius soli – and all those 
born to EU citizen parents outside the EU territory would automatically become citizens of the 
Union. As a consequence, State level citizenship would become derivative and determined by 
residence. This move would effectively transform the EU into a federal State and downgrade 
the Member State citizenship to provincial status.
Finally, we can imagine a utopian fourth step that would abolish birthright citizenship even 
at the level of the European supranational State and replace it with a uniform rule that in 
every polity all those and only those who are long-term residents will be counted as citizens. 
In contrast to the democracy-based argument in defence of birthright sketched above, some 
political theorists have argued from a cosmopolitan perspective that birthright citizenship 
is a major source of violence between States (Stevens 2001) or that it serves to maintain a 
globally unjust distribution of resources and opportunities (Carens 1987, p. 252; Shachar 2009, 
pp. 8-13). According to this view, the three preceding proposals should be regarded as merely 
intermediary steps on the road to universal residence-based citizenship.
As my earlier discussion of the conditions for residential citizenship at the local level has made 
clear, I am not convinced by this project. Its third step, at which the current Union would 
be replaced by a federal State, cannot be ruled out a priori. There may be future economic, 
political, or military crises that convince Member States of the need for a much deeper 
political integration. Yet, such a possible response to a life-threatening challenge must not be 
confused with a hidden telos that supposedly pulls the EU towards becoming a federal State, 
even in the absence of democratic support by its citizens.
The fourth scenario, in my view, is even more clearly a dystopian rather than a utopian one. It 
is difficult to imagine how democratic political communities could be formed and maintained 
without assurances of trans-generational continuity provided by birthright membership. 
Though, we cannot rule out this possibility on purely normative grounds. In a hypothetical 
world where most people are migrants living outside their countries of origin for most of 
their lives, maintaining birthright membership would amount to establishing a tyranny of 
sedentary minorities over mobile majorities. Current residence would then become the only 
justifiable basis for linking territorial jurisdictions to populations of citizens. I assume that in 
this scenario only minimal States could claim legitimate authority. Considerations of social 
justice that support public systems of education, health, and welfare based on redistributive 
taxation would find little popular support, and democratic participation would be reduced 
to a small politically-interested elite. The need for belonging to associations with birthright 
membership would then not vanish completely, but would probably be articulated through the 
formation of non-territorial associations based on religion, class, or ethnicity. What I cannot 
imagine is how democracy as we know it could survive such a radical disconnect between 
residence-based territorial jurisdictions and birthright-based non-territorial associations 
(Bauböck, 2011).
In today’s world, less than 4% of the global population is comprised of international migrants 
residing for more than twelve months outside their country of birth.8 Among the 507 million 
8  United Nations, International Migration Report 2006. A Global Assessment. E. a. S. A. P. Division (2006).
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EU residents, 4.1% are TCNs and 2.7% are SCNs.9 In such a world, instead of dismantling 
territorial and trans-generational political communities with largely sedentary populations 
for the sake of promoting geographic mobility, migrants must be enabled to integrate as equal 
citizens into these polities at all levels.
In conclusion, for the time being, we should explore alternative ways of resolving the 
deficiencies of EU citizenship. The starting point should be to accept it as a potentially 
coherent and normatively attractive constellation of three interconnected membership 
regimes: a birthright-based one at the Member State level, a residential one at the local 
level, and a derivative regime with residence-based rights at the supranational level. This 
perspective gives rise to a few modest reforms. 
The first would be to extend the local franchise to all residents in all Member States. Instead of 
deriving the local citizenship and franchise from the national and European citizenships, the 
former would be based on its own distinct principle of inclusion, a principle already embraced 
by twelve Member States and implicitly present as well in the local democracy in the other 
States. The main obstacle for this reform is the constitutional construction of a unitary demos 
across all levels within a State. The anachronistic character of this constitutional conception is 
also displayed by the fact that campaigns for a local franchise for TCNs have been surprisingly 
resilient even in France, Germany, and Austria where constitutional courts or councils have 
blocked reforms (Pedroza 2012, p. 37, 137-144).
The second reform would ensure that European citizens residing in other Member States do 
not lose their representation at national levels. This can easily be achieved by introducing 
absentee ballots in those few Member States that still have not done so – Cyprus, Ireland, 
Malta and Greece – or by scrapping provisions in other countries – such as the UK and 
Denmark – that withdraw voting rights after a certain period of residence abroad.10 Serious 
concerns in countries with large diasporas that a general right of external voting might impact 
electoral results too strongly could be taken into account by limiting an absentee franchise 
to SCNs and excluding emigrants residing in third countries, or by reducing the weight of the 
external vote by counting it separately for specially reserved seats (Bauböck 2007, p. 2446). 
There are reasons why external voting has recently become a global democratic standard and 
these reasons can be decisively reinforced through the imperative that free movement inside 
the EU must not lead to a loss of democratic representation at any level. A final argument for 
the external franchise solution rather than the extension of national voting rights to SCNs 
in their country of residence is that the former reform affirms the derivative nature of EU 
citizenship that the latter denies (see Bauböck, Cayla, Seth 2012).
The third and most important reform would be to coordinate access to EU and national 
citizenships through some common basic standards for ius soli and ius sanguinis for 
naturalization, renunciation, and withdrawal. Allowing the CJEU to expand the scope of EU 
citizenship rights while denying the EU any competence to harmonize Member State policies 
9  EUROSTAT 2012 available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
EU_citizenship_-_statistics_on_cross-border_activities
10  On July 4, 2012, the German Constitutional Court abolished the three-month German residence requirement for 
external voting in German elections (BVerfG, 2 BvC 1/11 vom 4.7.2012). In the 2013 national elections, German citizens 
without prior residence in Germany could vote if they could demonstrate some familiarity with German politics and 
that they were affected by it, information available at: http://www.konsularinfo.diplo.de/wahlen. In January 2014 
the EU Commission asked five Member States (Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom) to change 
their electoral rules in order to allow all their nationals residing in other Member States to vote in national elections 
(Commision Reccomendation of 29.1.2014. Addressing the consequences of disenfranchisement of Union citizens 







with regard to citizenship status undermines the legitimacy of the Court. It is also likely to 
create conflicts between States suspecting each other of undermining their immigration 
control powers, and leaves the EU agendas of harmonizing integration policies towards TCNs 
and promoting the political participation of SCNs in their host countries radically incomplete.
None of these reforms challenges the derivative nature of EU citizenship or the importance of 
birthright membership in the Member States that, after all, have created the European Union. 
These reforms instead make explicit the State of yet underdeveloped multi-level structure of 
citizenship in the European polity.
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